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Introduction 
There is growing awareness that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are being 
undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. 
Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in this sub-region, 
pervasive insecurity in this resource-laden maritime environment has resulted in more than $2 
billion in annual financial losses, significantly constrained investment and economic prospects, 
growing crime and potentially adverse political consequences. Historically, the concept of security 
has had two broad characteristics in many African countries. First, security has been associated 
with the perpetuation of a regime and not necessarily the welfare of a country and its inhabitants. 
Secondly, the focus has been primarily land-centric, because regime security has seldom had a 
maritime dimension. Consequently, maritime security arrangements in the Gulf of Guinea are 
under-resourced and have received scant policy attention. 
A number of recent national and regional initiatives suggest a paradigm shift, as African countries, 
commercial entities, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders increasingly 
recognize the wide-ranging benefits of enhanced maritime security. This article provides an 
overview of maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea and evaluates the efficacy of recent 
efforts to address them. The article concludes by briefly examining key national and global 
implications of improved maritime security in this sub-region. 
Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Gulf of Guinea’s Maritime Domain 
For the purpose of this article, the Gulf of Guinea is defined as the 11 coastal countries along the 
West and Central African countries that lie between Ghana and Angola (see Figure 1). This sub-
region has a coastline of some 5,500 kilometers, roughly the size of the Gulf of Mexico. The 
maritime domain may be described as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, 
or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”[1] In terms of geographical 
scope, the maritime domain could be defined as (a) territorial waters, 12 nautical miles from the 
coast; (b) contiguous zone or coastal waters, 24 nautical miles from the coast; and (c) the 
exclusive economic zone or EEZ, 200 nautical miles from the coast.[2] Exerting effective and 
sustained governance over this vast maritime domain is the daunting task facing countries in this 
sub-region. Maritime security relates to prevention of unlawful acts in the maritime domain, 
whether they directly impact the country or region in question, or the perpetrators are in transit. 
Some of the main threats and vulnerabilities in the Gulf of Guinea are discussed below. 
Figure 1: Map of the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Threats 
Poaching. An inability to exercise control over their maritime domain has made it difficult for Gulf 
of Guinea states to enjoy the full benefits of the significant fisheries resources in their EEZ. 
Recent studies suggest that poaching by vessels from Asia, Europe and other parts of Africa 
costs the sub-region some $370 million annually.[3] In addition to the financial losses, poaching 
also has human security costs. Households and individuals are affected directly via reduced 
availability of seafood in local markets. Data from the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) indicates that fish accounts for most of the protein intake in most countries—
in Ghana it is 63%, Equatorial Guinea (62%) and Sao Tome and Principe (62%). Poaching also 
has a number of indirect effects, including the drastic reduction of incomes and loss of means of 
livelihood in fishing communities.  
Piracy. The International Maritime Bureau ranks the Gulf of Guinea as one of the most troubled 
global waterways. Since the late 1990s, this sub-region consistently ranked among the top piracy 
hot spots worldwide. Between 2002 and 2004, piracy attacks in this sub-region exceeded 
recorded incidents in the rest of the continent (see Figure Two). While there is some debate 
about definitional issues (including the inclusion of certain categories of petty theft) and data 
reliability, there is broad consensus that criminal activity in this part of the continent is worrisome. 
The charts illustrate that unlike most other parts of the continent, the vast majority of these 
attacks resulted in an actual boarding. This reflects a heightened level of maritime insecurity.  
Figure 2: Piracy Attacks in Africa 
 
 
Source: International Maritime Bureau statistics. 
National and trans-national crime. Growing crime complicates the tenuous security climate in this 
sub-region’s maritime domain. Poor maritime governance significantly facilitates oil theft (also 
referred to as “illegal bunkering” in some literature) in the Niger Delta region, with dire regional 
ramifications. This highly organized activity costs the sub-region around $1.2 billion every year in 
lost revenue.[4] In addition, the criminal gangs responsible for oil theft contribute to the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. Recent evidence suggests that the 
weaponry is becoming more sophisticated and lethal as the criminal gangs seek to evade 
national law enforcement personnel.[5]  
Another criminal trend worth noting is the transshipment of narcotics. The Gulf of Guinea is 
becoming a major narco-trafficking hub. A significant amount of high-grade cocaine seized in 
what Spanish authorities have dubbed “the new drug triangle between Cape Verde, the Canary 
Islands and Madeira”[6] was routed via the Gulf of Guinea, in vessels manned by crews from the 
sub-region.  
Disputed Boundaries. Enduring disagreements over maritime boundaries could precipitate armed 
conflict, particularly when the disputed areas have significant economic potential or are strategic 
transportation hubs. 
These disputes also make it much more difficult for countries in the sub-region to address shared 
security challenges in a collaborative manner. Examples of maritime disputes in the Gulf of 
Guinea include those between: Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula; Equatorial 
Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River; and Gabon and Equatorial 
Guinea over the Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries.  
Environmental degradation. Pollution and environmental degradation are relatively unchecked in 
the Gulf of Guinea. The 2005 Abuja Declaration[7] reiterates issues highlighted in analysis by the 
Food and Agricultural Organization,[8] which indicates that a mismanagement of fisheries 
resources in the sub-region has led to stock depletion, distorted ecological balance and 
environmental degradation. Less than 25 percent of the countries in this sub-region have ratified 
the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation.[9] The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA)—the oil industry’s focal point for communication—are working 
with African governments to encourage the ratification and implementation of relevant 
conventions. Their objectives in the Gulf of Guinea are articulated in the Convention for Co-
operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West 
and Central African Region (WACAF or Abidjan Convention).[10] Although the petroleum industry 
has been singled out as a major polluter in a lot of literature, improper domestic and industrial 
waste disposal also poses a significant threat. 
Vulnerabilities 
Maritime domain awareness. As mentioned earlier, the traditional land-centric approach to 
security in the sub-region contributed to a systemic neglect of maritime forces in both absolute 
and relative terms. It is, therefore, not surprising that countries in the sub-region are unaware of 
most traffic and activities in their territorial waters. Basic equipment (such as functioning 
surveillance systems), materiel (including patrol craft) and trained personnel are in short supply. 
According to data published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, patrol boats are 
deficient in the sub-region, with most listed assets categorized as “unseaworthy” in Angola, Benin, 
Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[11] Poor maritime domain awareness 
undermines security by making it possible for criminals to operate with impunity—thereby 
jeopardizing safety.  
Legislative and judicial arrangements. While countries in this sub-region are signatories to most 
relevant international conventions,[12] very few have taken concrete measures to ratify and 
institutionalize these protocols domestically.[13] Creating and enforcing the necessary provisions 
would require sustained political will, the enactment of enabling legislation, the strengthening of 
relevant institutions and enforcement mechanisms, and devoting adequate financial and human 
resources to maritime security. This vulnerability is highlighted in local media reports about 
poachers apprehended in the sub-region, who often have to be released after paying only 
minimal fines because the country in question did not have the right laws on their books. However, 
even when appropriate laws exist (as they do in most countries), the ability to effectively 
prosecute depends on the strength and independence of the judiciary. In most cases a 
combination of corruption, inefficiency and capacity constraints compromise the effectiveness of 
the judicial system.  
Weak infrastructure. Most port and surveillance infrastructure is in need of repair, upgrading or 
replacement. Failure to pay sufficient attention to this crucial aspect of maritime security over the 
years is partly responsible for the current state of affairs. According to IMO progress reports, 
countries in this sub-region are yet to fully comply with standards for port safety and security 
outlined in the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, to which all countries are 
signatories. In addition, an estimated 85 percent of vessels registered in Gulf of Guinea states are 
more than 20 years old, making them more susceptible to accidents—the global average for 
vessels more than 20 years old is only 15 percent.[14] 
Some Human Security Implications[15] 
The threats and vulnerabilities outlined above have had wide-ranging effects on human security 
in the Gulf of Guinea, some of which have already been discussed. Together, they undermine 
economic activity, hinder the movement of goods and services, and make it difficult for these 
countries to attain their development goals. By affecting these areas, maritime security problems 
compound the sub-region’s human security challenges. Therefore, understanding the implications 
of continued maritime insecurity (in all its forms) makes a strong case for urgent, comprehensive 
and collaborative reform. 
Economic Losses. Poaching undermines the local fishing industry, crime is a disincentive to 
commerce because it increases the cost of doing business, and pollution undermines tourism by 
degrading the beach and marine environments. The fiscal impact of these losses is felt via lost 
landing fees, licensing fees, taxes, and levies; as well as via the onerous spending required to 
respond to security incidents. The quantum of annual losses exceeds debt service requirements 
on multilateral loans in the sub-region. This suggests that efforts to reduce these losses could 
enhance government revenue, thereby facilitating more investment in health, education and 
poverty reduction. Potential additional revenue could also be used to fund maritime security 
initiatives; the Ghanaian government has adopted this approach to partially finance a “home 
grown” national maritime security strategy (with support from U.S. Naval Forces Europe).  
At a micro level, constrained economic activity limits employment opportunities, as well as the 
income earning potential, of coastal populations. Unemployment and low wages exacerbate 
human security concerns in the sub-region. Perhaps the most significant losses result from lost 
investment. Although some researchers estimate some $10 billion worth of investment in the Gulf 
of Guinea’s petroleum sector from 2005-2015,[16] continued instability in Nigeria’s Delta Region 
could force investors to reconsider their decisions.[17] Maritime instability is one reason many 
investors and entrepreneurs have shown relatively little interest in the sub-region’s potentially 
lucrative fishing and tourism industries.  
Trade and Shipping. The safety/security of shipping routes and facilities is also important 
because an overwhelming proportion of trade in the sub-region traverses the maritime domain. 
Insecure and inadequate facilities constrain activity and raise both transportation costs and 
insurance premiums. Trading partners (principally in Europe) have expressed some concern. For 
example, the failure of most cocoa exporting countries in the Gulf of Guinea to comply with the 
European Cocoa Association’s June 2004 directive on port security resulted in higher insurance 
costs for operators in those countries. Some countries are already taking steps to address this 
issue. The government of Benin signed a Millennium Challenge Compact with the United States 
in 2006, which in part included improvements to the port of Cotonou. This project prioritized 
measures to improve port safety and security as a means to promote economic growth and 
improve human security.  
Millennium Development Goals. In the late 1990s developing countries agreed on a set of eight 
broad objectives, and associated benchmarks, to reduce poverty and enhance human 
security.[18] Challenges in the maritime domain make it more difficult for countries in the Gulf of 
Guinea to attain these goals. Figure 3 illustrates this point by highlighting some relationships 
between improved maritime security and positive developments in the fisheries sector.[19]  
Figure 3: A Sample of Millennium Development Goals 
 
Growing Interest in the Gulf of Guinea 
The immense potential of the Gulf of Guinea (both in terms of its resource endowment and 
strategic importance as a shipping route/hub) has drawn domestic and international attention to 
the urgent need for focused action to address existing and potential challenges. Given the 
multifaceted nature of pervasive threats, any successful strategy would have to be inter-sectoral, 
and involve a broad spectrum of domestic and international stakeholders. Recent efforts by 
regional and international actors to consider appropriate and sustainable approaches to enhance 
maritime governance in the Gulf of Guinea are listed in Figure 4, below. 
Figure 4: Recent Meetings on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
• November 2006 (Cotonou, Benin). Ministerial conference on maritime safety and security 
in the Gulf of Guinea, organized by U.S. European Command, U.S. Naval Forces in 
Europe, U.S. State Department and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Further to 
recommendations from a March 2006 workshop (see below), this conference aimed to 
secure political commitments to implement comprehensive and effective national and 
regional strategies. The communiqué and Plan of Action adopted by the ministers 
discussed (a) the importance of taking practical steps to improve surveillance and 
information sharing, (b) the need for robust and appropriate laws and regulatory regimes, 
(c) the value of enhanced regional cooperation and policy harmonization, (d) the 
facilitating role of increased public awareness of the scope and effects of maritime 
insecurity, (e) the supportive role of bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental and 
commercial partners, and (f) the necessity of unwavering political will by leaders in the 
sub-region.  
• October 2006 (Dakar, Senegal). The 13th annual assembly of the International Maritime 
Organization/Maritime Organisation for West and Central African States.[20] The 
recommendations included (a) the need to establish an integrated coastguard function 
network of the west and central coast of Africa, (b) the importance of harmonizing 
legislation, practices and procedures, which together provide the security necessary for 
the safe and secure operation of port facilities and ships at all security levels, (c) the 
value of instituting national mechanisms for intra and intergovernmental agencies and 
other relevant stakeholders cooperation and coordination, and (d) the importance of 
appropriate national maritime security policies to safeguard maritime trade from all forms 
of unlawful acts.  
• August 2006 (Libreville, Gabon). Heads of State meeting of the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission.[21] Leaders of eight West and Central African countries convened a 
meeting to formally launch the organization and reiterate their continued sub-regional 
commitment to conflict resolution, socio-economic prosperity, environmental protection 
and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. A subsequent November 2006 meeting of 
heads of state did not materialize.  
• May/June 2006 (Abuja, Nigeria). Second Africa Sea Power Symposium. Heads of African 
navies met to discuss modalities to enhance professionalism, improve focus and increase 
collaboration. They agreed on the need to (a) enhance maritime domain awareness by 
adopting appropriate technology like automated identification systems, (b) set up a 
permanent structure at continental level to manage maritime related issues, (c) improve 
public awareness, and (d) take steps to adopt and implement international conventions.  
• March, 2006 (Accra, Ghana). U.S. European Command, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 
and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies organized an experts’ workshop on maritime 
safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. This workshop (a) analyzed the broad range of 
maritime safety and security threats facing countries in the Gulf of Guinea; (b) identified 
the multifaceted implications of continued instability in this region’s territorial waters; 
(c) evaluated the roles of domestic, regional and non-regional entities in exacerbating or 
abating maritime threats and vulnerabilities; (d) outlined the key elements of a 
comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable strategy for effective maritime safety and 
security in the Gulf of Guinea; and (e) highlighted practical steps that Gulf of Guinea 
states could take to individually and collectively to adopt and successfully implement 
such a strategy over time.  
• August 2005. The NEPAD declaration on sustainable fisheries in Africa was signed in 
Abuja, Nigeria. This initiative alludes to the importance of bolstering security and regional 
collaboration.  
• July 2005. The World Conservation Union expressed support for a sub-regional initiative 
to protect the maritime environment by delineating and eventually enforcing maritime 
protected areas in Africa, including the Gulf of Guinea.  
• June 2005. The creation of the Strategic Partnership for Fisheries in Africa; supported by 
the World Bank, African Union, World Wildlife Fund, and Food and Agricultural 
Organization. The Global Environment Fund committed a $60 million grant to support 
related activities.  
Since January 2004, there have been close to twenty international events focusing on various 
aspects of maritime security in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Although this trend has greatly 
contributed to a fuller appreciation of the nature, scope and implications of these issues 
(domestically, regionally and globally), much more needs to be done to translate good intentions 
into coherent, targeted and tangible strategies. Coordinating the outcomes of the various events 
and initiatives remains a serious challenge. For example, programs to provide equipment and 
training to improve maritime domain awareness should be complemented by efforts to improve 
arrest capabilities. Being better aware of activity in the maritime domain is of little value if steps 
could not be taken to successfully arrest wrongdoers. By the same token, measures to ratify 
international conventions and promulgate relevant domestic legislation should be accompanied 
by judicial reform. Good laws require a robust, capable and independent judiciary. 
The United States has played an important role in the Gulf of Guinea not only by hosting 
meetings for experts and decision-makers to consider and develop appropriate strategies, but 
also by providing technical and material support. The U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(September 2005) highlights the importance of integrating efforts to address all threats to 
maritime security. It underscores the United States’ commitment to assisting African countries to 
promote maritime sovereignty by helping them improve monitoring, establish responsive decision-
making arrangements, enhance interdiction capacity, develop effective policing protocols and 
promote regional coordination.[22] Furthermore, the U.S. International Outreach and Coordination 
Strategy for the National Strategy for Maritime Security emphasizes the importance of “enhanced 
outreach to foreign governments, international and regional organizations, private sector partners 
and the public to solicit support for improved global maritime security.”[23] In December 2006, the 
Bush Administration unveiled the African Maritime Governance Initiative, which is a multi-agency 
approach to enhanced maritime governance. This initiative will help African countries improve 
maritime domain awareness and prevent exploitation/misuse of resources, and improve law 
enforcement efforts, secure facilities and sea lanes.   
Developing a Strategic Approach for Enhanced Maritime Governance 
A strategic approach for the Gulf of Guinea requires consistency between domestic and partner-
initiated programs, as well as significant regional collaboration given the trans-national character 
of most threats and vulnerabilities. Thus, an effective strategy must incorporate national, regional 
and global realities. While the precise configuration would largely be country-specific, effective 
strategies would broadly adhere to a four-fold framework encompassing: demonstrable political 
commitment, increased operational efficiency, transparent regulatory systems, and heightened 
public awareness. 
1. Demonstrable Political Commitment 
Strong political will and national ownership are a vital part of an effective strategy. Leaders and 
citizens must demonstrate an unwavering commitment to address corruption and implement 
comprehensive strategies. An unwavering political will (which is central to any successful strategy) 
is currently lacking because (a) vestiges of a land-centric approach still persist, (b) some 
authorities are complicit, and (c) other authorities are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. 
Given the trans-national character of maritime security threats, this political will must also be 
expressed regionally. In this vein, countries in the sub-region must be willing to cede sovereignty 
concerns to advance regional solutions in this regard. 
The success of political and policy pronouncements is contingent upon long-term engagement 
and an inclusive and participatory political process. Gulf of Guinea states have already taken 
tangible steps to elevate maritime security issues. The November 2006 communiqué adopted at 
the Maritime Safety and Security Ministerial Conference in Benin clearly articulates sub-regional 
commitment to demonstrate sustained political will. National governments are also making 
progress. The government of Gabon has identified a focal ministry to coordinate maritime security 
programs and established a Maritime Safety Committee to bolster inter-agency collaboration. The 
Nigerian government established the Presidential Implementation Committee for Maritime Safety 
and Security (PICOMSS) in 2005, reporting directly to the head of state, as a demonstration of its 
renewed commitment to improved maritime security. 
2. Increased Operational Efficiency 
Countries need to take immediate steps to detect, apprehend and prosecute wrongdoers. This 
requires the acquisition of appropriate equipment, technology and trained human resources, 
including obtaining appropriate and adequate AIS systems and surveillance infrastructure. 
Countries also need to develop processes and policies that would enhance inter-agency 
coordination and domestic/sub-regional information sharing and analysis. 
Capacity building is necessary to recruit and retain required personnel. Gulf of Guinea countries 
have benefited from multilateral and bilateral initiatives in this regard. In 2005, the International 
Maritime Organization conducted two national (Gabon and Nigeria) and one sub-regional (held in 
Ghana) “train the trainers” workshops on maritime security. The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. 
Naval Forces in Europe have also been very instrumental in supporting capacity building 
initiatives across the sub-region. 
Several of the Gulf of Guinea countries are taking steps in the right direction. Benin’s market 
access project, part of its MCA program, aims to improve operational efficiency by upgrading 
surveillance and communication facilities and strengthening institutional reforms. Angola’s 
National Maritime Surveillance System plans to install new radar systems, adopt appropriate AIS 
technology, and introduce sea patrol vessels and aircraft in order to improve its ability to 
effectively monitor its maritime environment. The government also plans to establish a network of 
data collection and processing centers to expedite and facilitate relevant information flows. 
At the sub-regional level, Gulf of Guinea countries are committed to collaborative action via the 
MOWCA initiative. Objectives agreed upon during the July 2006 IMO/MOWCA meeting include 
the establishment of (a) an integrated sub-regional coast guard network, (b) a center for 
information and communication, (c) a transit facilitation and “sealed grid” system, and (d) a 
regional maritime fund to support these efforts. 
3. Transparent Regulatory Systems 
Countries in the sub-region need to adopt and ratify of international conventions, which would 
provide a framework for a robust regulatory framework. Within this context, domestic legislative 
frameworks must be made more transparent and enforceable, while judicial systems should be 
reformed and judges more accountable. 
In addition to taking steps to ratify and implement all relevant international conventions, however, 
Gulf of Guinea states are also reviewing domestic legislation. Harmonizing sub-regional laws 
would facilitate policy implementation—for example, the ability of sub-regional states to 
collaborate on issues like “hot pursuit.” Gabon updated its Merchant Marine Code (January 1963) 
in December 1994, and introduced specific laws to secure its fishing industry (Law No. 15/2005) 
in 2005. Other countries (like Ghana) are recognizing that existing laws and regulations may only 
have limited utility. According to senior Ghanaian officials, existing fisheries laws only affect the 
country’s two industrial ports in Tema and Takoradi, while 334 smaller landing sites (catering to 
an estimated 13,000 smaller vessels) are relatively ignored. Efforts are currently underway to 
make the legislative framework more comprehensive in scope and implementation. 
4. Heightened Public Awareness 
Finally, sensitizing leaders and general public about the potential maritime security benefits 
makes it easier to build national/regional ownership for investments in maritime security. 
Understanding the implications of continued threats also helps domestic and sub-regional actors 
better understand their respective roles. The Plan of Action adopted at the 2006 ministerial 
conference in Benin commits Gulf of Guinea states to develop national and sub-regional 
strategies for increasing public awareness about maritime safety and security, and establish an 
interactive database and dedicated website to educate and sensitize the general public about the 
opportunities and challenges in the maritime domain. 
Conclusion 
As evidenced by their active participation and policy commitments at various regional programs, 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea recognize the importance of maritime security in the sub-region. 
Many governments are taking steps to formulate and implement national and regional strategies 
to address the growing challenges they face. Gulf of Guinea leaders need to move from good 
intentions to tangible results. It is also clear that no single country will be successful on its own. 
The benefits of the region’s abundantly endowed maritime domain could be derived through a 
firm commitment to collective action. A shared investment in maritime security (which is a “public 
good”) would have far-reaching human security benefits, and positive global implications. 
Regional organizations (like MOWCA), international agencies (like the IMO), commercial entities 
(like petroleum and fishing companies) and bilateral partners (like the United States) could play a 
crucial role, but their efforts would have limited utility if they are not well coordinated and 
consistent with the needs of the sub-region. Luckily, both the governments and citizens of Gulf of 
Guinea states are much better sensitized about the opportunities and vulnerabilities in their 
maritime domain than in the past, and their expressed commitment to joint action to combat 
shared threats, with assistance from a broad range of partners, bodes well for the future. 
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